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ABSTRACT 
This article analyses the practical importance of confidentiality and privilege in mediation with 
particular emphasis on issues of disclosure of what occurred in a mediation and compellability of 
mediators in any subsequent litigation.  The piece focuses on the gap between the theory behind 
confidentiality in mediation  W i.e. that it is largely assured in the process  W and the reality in which the 
privacy of mediation, protected by and large by the general without prejudice rules, may be rendered 
far more porous in practice.  The article suggests that mediation would benefit from the statutory 
development of rules pertaining to confidentiality that undergird the process itself and in this sense 
analyses two extant provisions that already apply in the UK in relation to cross border mediations, 
and family mediation in Scotland respectively which could provide a model for more general reform. 
 
THE PRACTICAL SIGNIFICANCE OF CONFIDENTIALITY IN MEDIATION * 
Introduction 
Mediation may be described as  ‘ĂĨůĞǆŝďůĞƉƌŽĐĞƐƐĐŽŶĚƵĐƚĞĚĐŽŶĨŝĚĞŶƚŝĂůůǇŝŶǁŚŝĐŚĂŶĞƵƚƌĂůƉĞƌƐŽŶ
actively assists the parties in working towards a negotiated agreement of a dispute or difference, 
with the parties in ultimate control of the decision to settle and the terms of resolƵƚŝŽŶ ? ?1 So the 
process essentially aims to facilitate the continued negotiation between disputing parties in order to 
enable a mutually beneficial outcome to be reached.  Mediation should, therefore, be viewed as a 
private law arrangement,2 which aims to enable the parties to resolve their dispute, rather than the 
dispute being solved by the mediation itself.  
Whilst it is certainly true that mediation as a forum of dispute settlement is not novel,3 but rather 
appears to have roots in the ancient world,4 modern practice has developed rapidly towards the end 
of the twentieth and early twenty first Centuries.5  This is no surprise.  There are a number of 
potential benefits offered by the settling of disputes through mediation,6 at least as a precursor to 
traditional litigation.  In this regard, mediation when successful has the potential to be not only 
cheaper,7 ďƵƚĂůƐŽ ‘ůĞƐƐĂĚǀĞƌƐĂƌŝĂů ?8 than litigation.  The cost savings appear to relate not only to the 
direct financial costs of proceedings, but also arise in terms of time costs which may be avoided by 
the settlement of disputes without the need to resort to court processes.9  
                                                          
* Andrew Agapiou and Bryan Clark, University of Strathclyde 
1 ĞŶƚƌĞĨŽƌĨĨĞĐƚŝǀĞŝƐƉƵƚĞZĞƐŽůƵƚŝŽŶ ? ‘'ůŽƐƐĂƌǇŽĨdĞƌŵƐ ? ?ŶĚ ) ?ŶƉ )ĂǀĂŝůĂďůĞĂƚ
http://www.cedr.com/about_us/library/glossary.php accessed 17/3/2016.  This definition sets out a classic, facilitative and 
 ‘ŶŽƌŵŐĞŶĞƌĂƚŝŶŐ ?ĨŽƌŵŽĨŵĞĚŝĂƚŝŽŶĂŶƚŝĐŝƉĂƚĞĚďǇŵŽƐƚĐŽĚĞƐŽĨƉƌĂĐƚŝĐĞ W see ůůĞŶtĂůĚŵĂŶ ? ‘/ĚĞŶƚŝĨǇŝŶŐƚŚĞƌŽůĞŽĨ
ƐŽĐŝĂůŶŽƌŵƐŝŶŵĞĚŝĂƚŝŽŶ PĂŵƵůƚŝƉůĞŵŽĚĞůĂƉƉƌŽĂĐŚ ? ? ? ? ? ? )Hastings Law Journal 48(4): 703-770  
2 'ůĂŶŬĞ ? ‘KWƵďůŝƐŚĞƐ,ĞĂƌŝŶŐZĞƉŽƌƚŽŶƌďŝƚƌĂƚŝŽŶĂŶĚŽŵƉĞƚŝƚŝŽŶ ? ? ? ? ? ? )CGLR 6(1) R9-R14, R11 
3 ZŽĞďƵĐŬ ? ‘dŚĞDǇƚŚŽĨDŽĚĞƌŶDĞĚŝĂƚŝŽŶ ? ? ? ? ? ? )Arbitration 73(1) 105-116, passim 
4 Z>ďĞů ? ‘DĞĚŝĂƚŝŽŶŝŶWƌĞ-ĂƉŝƚĂůŝƐƚ^ŽĐŝĞƚŝĞƐ ? ? ? ? ? ? )Windsor Yearbook of Access to Justice 175-185, 181 
5 P ƌŽŽŬĞƌĂŶĚ>ĂǀĞƌƐ ? ‘ŽŵŵĞƌĐŝĂůĂŶĚŽŶƐƚƌƵĐƚŝŽŶZ P>ĂǁǇĞƌƐ ?ƚƚŝƚƵĚĞƐĂŶĚǆƉĞƌŝĞŶĐĞ ? ? ? ? ? ? )CJQ 20(Oct) 327-
347, 327 
6 P Brooker Mediation Law: Journey Through Institutionalism to Juridification (Routledge 2013) 9 
7 ĂƌƌŽůů ? ‘ƌĞtĞZĞĂĚǇĨŽƌZŝŶƵƌŽƉĞ ? ? ? ? ? ? )International Financial Law Review 8 Part 12, 11 
8 Brooker (n6) 9 
9 ƌĂĚǇ ? ‘:ĂĐŬƐŽŶŶĚŽƌƐĞƐƚŚĞĞŶĞĨŝƚƐŽĨDĞĚŝĂƚŝŽŶŝŶƚŚĞ>ĞŐĂůWƌŽĐĞƐƐŝŶŶŐůĂŶĚĂŶĚtĂůĞƐ ? ? ? ? ? ? )Arbitration 76(2) 
251-264, 252 
It has also been suggested that mediation offers parties the opportunity to settle disputes in a 
manner which may facilitate a continued commercial relationship,10 as opposed to traditional 
litigation which may render such a relationship if not impossible, exceedingly difficult.11  The 
mediation process has thus been considered by some commentators to represent  ‘ŚƵŵĂŶ ůĞŐĂů
ĞǀŽůƵƚŝŽŶ ?12 in the sense that it enables parties to gain an understanding of the reasons leading to 
the dispute in order to lead to improved future relations. This so-called conflict theory claims then 
that mediation enables parties not only to understand better the type of conflict which has led to 
the dispute, but also to reach a mutually beneficial solution and in some cases, promote continued 
relations between the parties.13  Research would further suggest that settlements reached through 
mediation processes have the potential to be successful in the long term due to the fact that 
ƐŽůƵƚŝŽŶƐ ĂƌĞ ĚĞƐŝŐŶĞĚ ƚŽ ďĞ ĨůĞǆŝďůĞ ĂŶĚ  ‘ŐĞŶĞƌĂƚĞ Ă ŚŝŐŚĞƌ ůĞǀĞů Žf mutual satisfaction with 
ŽƵƚĐŽŵĞƐ ?14 for the parties rather than rigid outcomes imposed by court15.  
This notwithstanding, the ostensible benefits largely do rest upon mediation being successful and it 
is far from clear that mediation practice is indeed to be considered a generally successful 
operation.16 Although the flexibility of outcomes may certainly be considered a benefit, it may be the 
case that such flexibility stems from want of a cohesive governing framework relating to mediation 
practice, which in turn may create a number of potential difficulties,17 ƐƵĐŚĂƐĂůĂĐŬŽĨ ‘ƉƌĞĚŝĐƚĂďůĞ
ƌĞƐƵůƚƐ ?18 for disputing parties.   
More generally, it has been argued that there is a gap between the theoretical ideal, which holds 
that mediation is an effective conflict resolution tool, and its practical success which may be 
achieved in any given dispute.19  There is much scholarly analysis of the various reasons for this, 
including suggestions that the success of mediation rests on the ability of the mediator in practice to 
remain impartial,20 whether the narrowly defined parameters of the mediation in question21 are 
sufficient to allow the effective application of conflict theory, and the resulting capacity on the part 
                                                          
10 S ZƵƚƚůĞY ? ‘DĞĚŝĂƚŝŽŶ P^ŽĐŝĂůŶƚŝďŽĚǇ ? ? ? ? ? ? ? )Arbitration 79(3) 295-308, 295 
11 Brooker (n6) 10 
12 C Menkel-DĞĂĚŽǁ ? ‘ŚĂƌƚĞƌĞĚ/ŶƐƚŝƚƵƚĞŽĨƌďŝƚƌĂƚŽƌƐ ?th Symposium on Mediation, October 2015: The Case for 
Mediation: The Things That Mediators Should Be >ĞĂƌŶŝŶŐĂŶĚŽŝŶŐ ? ? ? ? ? ? )Arbitration 82(1) 22-33, 23 
13 C Menkel-DĞĂĚŽǁ ? ‘ŽŶĨůŝĐƚdŚĞŽƌǇ ?ŝŶ<ŚƌŝƐƚĞŶƐĞŶĂŶĚ>ĞǀŝƐŽŶ ?Encyclopedia of Community: From the Village to the 
sŝƌƚƵĂůtŽƌůĚ ?(Second Edition, Sage Publications 2003) passim 
14 S Goldberg and FEA Sanders, Dispute Resolution: Negotiation, Mediation and Other Processes (Sixth Edition, Aspen 
Publishers 2012) (Kindle Version np) 
15 For some examples of the improved durability of mediation settlements as opposed to litigated outcomes see B 
EĞŝŵĞŝũĞƌĂŶĚDWĞů ‘ŽƵƌƚďĂƐĞĚŵĞĚŝĂƚŝŽŶŝŶƚŚĞEĞƚŚĞƌůĂŶĚƐ PƌĞƐĞĂƌĐŚĞǀĂůƵĂƚŝŽŶĂŶĚĨƵƚƵƌĞĞǆƉĞĐƚĂƚŝŽŶƐ ? ? ? ? ? ? )Penn 
State Law Review 110 345-379, 363-364; M Ross and D Bain In Court Mediation Pilots: report on evaluation of in court 
mediation schemes in Glasgow and Aberdeen Sheriff Courts (Scottish Government 2010) at para 5.17. 
16 'ĞƌĂŵŝ ? ‘ƌŝĚŐŝŶŐƚŚĞdŚĞŽƌǇĂŶĚWƌĂĐƚŝĐĞ'ĂƉ PDĞĚŝĂƚŽƌW ǁĞƌŝŶWƌĂĐƚŝĐĞ ? ? ? ? ? ? )Conflict Resolution Quarterly 26(4) 
433-451, 434-435.  It should be recognized that success can be measured in numerous ways and is not exclusive to 
settlement.  Partial settlement or the narrowing of issues in dispute post mediation is common.  See for example, the 
evidence in relation to Scottish commercial mediation  in B. Clark and C. DĂǁƐŽŶ ? ‘ZĂŶĚ^ĐŽƚƚŝƐŚŽŵŵĞƌĐŝĂů>ŝƚŝŐĂƚŽƌƐ P
^ƚƵĚǇŽĨƚƚŝƚƵĚĞƐĂŶĚǆƉĞƌŝĞŶĐĞ ? ? ? ? ? ? )ŝǀŝů:ƵƐƚŝĐĞYƵĂƌƚĞƌůǇ ? ? ?Ɖƌ ) ? ? ?-249 at 237 
17 T Allen, Mediation Law and Civil Practice (Bloomsbury Professional 2013) vii 
18 JG Bolton, The Mediation Handbook: A Practical Guide for Lawyers and Participants in the Art of Mediation (Second 
Edition, Create Space Independent Publishing Platform 2012) 8 
19 Gerami (n16) 434-435 
20 KŽŚĞŶ ?EĂƚƚŶĞƌĂŶĚ>ƵǆĞŶďƵƌŐ ? ‘dŚĞ>ŝŵŝƚƐŽĨƚŚĞD ĚŝĂƚŽƌ ?ƐEĞƵƚƌĂůŝƚǇ ? ? ? ? ? ? )Mediation Quarterly 16(4) 341-
348, 341 
21 >>ZŝƐŬŝŶ ? ‘tŚŽĞĐŝĚĞƐ ?ZĞƚŚŝŶŬŝŶŐƚŚĞ'ƌŝĚŽĨDĞĚŝĂƚŽƌK ŝĞŶƚĂƚŝŽŶ ? ? ? ? ? ? )Dispute Resolution Magazine 22(9) 23, 
passim  
of the mediator to influence the parties to the dispute.22 While these all represent important issues, 
the aim of this article is to contribute to the understanding of the gap between mediation theory 
and practice in terms of mediation confidentiality.  In terms of assessing the ability of mediators to 
 ‘ƉƌŽǀŝĚĞƐĞĐƵƌŝƚǇ ?23 to disputing parties, and indeed to ensure that conflict theory can be applied in 
order to aid the parties understanding of that dispute and support the maintenance of continued 
relations24, it must be observed that whilst mediation agreements are likely to contain 
confidentiality clauses,25 such provisions are limited by the general position in the UK that 
confidentiality itself is not sufficient justification for the non-disclosure of documents in any 
subsequent litigation.26 It is argued that in general there remains the potential that parties may fear 
that confidentiality is simply an illusion in mediation practice, thus contributing to the gap between 
what mediation is able to achieve in theory compared to in practice.  There is, therefore, a need to 
examine the extent to which confidentiality can be achieved in mediation. 
Against this backdrop the aims of this work as are as follows: 
1. What is the significance of mediation confidentiality from a purely theoretical perspective, 
and are there any implications resulting from a lack of confidentiality that may arise in 
practice27?  
2. Has the lack of a consistent law pertaining to mediation had any implications for the 
question of confidentiality from a practical perspective and does the recent surge in English 
case law offer any useful guidance in this respect?  
3. Has the lack of a coherent law relating to mediation practice had an impact on the ability of 
mediators and parties to ensure that confidentiality is respected not only in a particular 
mediation, but also in any subsequent litigation?  
4. What is the likelihood of the success of implementation of any proposed reforms and what 
impact could this have upon mediation practice, in respect of confidentiality?   
 
The focus on the work shall be primarily on general, civil non-family mediation in the UK although 
reference to mediation in family and cross border matters and in particular specific legislation 
pertaining to confidentiality in these contexts shall be made.  The work begins by examining the 
importance of confidentiality in mediation.  It will then consider the problems which may arise from 
a lack of confidentiality in disputes, and the circumstances which may give rise to such a lack of 
confidentiality.  The article then proceeds to an evaluation of key case law in this context in order to 
highlight not only the importance of confidentiality in mediation, but also the implications of a 
failure to achieve it in reality.  The work then presents suggestions for reform of the law in order to 
ensure that confidentiality in mediation, rather than being an ideal, is an achievable goal which 
                                                          
22 Gerami (n16) 434 
23 ,ůůĞŶ ? ‘ŽŶĨŝĚĞŶƚŝĂůŝƚǇ P'ƵŝĚĞĨŽƌDĞĚŝĂƚŽƌƐ ? ? ? ? ? ? )ADR Times 31, online edition, np,  available at 
http://www.cedr.com/articles/?item=Confidentiality-a-guide-for-mediators accessed 15/3/2016 
24 Where relevant 
25 :dƵŵďƌŝĚŐĞ ? ‘DĞĚŝators: Confidentiality and Compulsion to Give Evidence  W /ƐƐƵĞƐŝŶŶŐůĂŶĚ ? ? ? ? ? ? )ICCLR 21(4) 144-
148, 145.   
26 Earl of Malmesbury v Strutt & Parker [2008] EWHC 424 (QB) 
27 This article focuses primarily on the issue of confidentiality as it relates to admissibility of evidence and mediator 
compellability in subsequent court proceedings.  It does not deal with the related issue of what Alexander terms 
 ‘ŝŶƐŝĚĞƌ ?ŝŶƐŝĚĞƌ ?ĐŽŶĨŝĚĞŶƚŝĂůŝƚǇ W e.g .ƚŚĞŵĞĚŝĂƚŽƌ ?ƐĚƵƚǇŶŽƚƚŽĚŝƐĐůŽƐĞĐŽŶĨŝĚĞŶƚŝĂůŝŶĨŽƌŵĂƚŝŽŶŐůĞĂŶĞĚĨƌŽŵŽŶĞƉĂƌƚǇ
in private session to the other party without consent  W see Nadja Alexander, The Mediation Manual: Hong Kong Edition 
(1st, LexisNexis, 2014) at 382. 
promotes the success of mediation processes. Here we also consider the necessary limitations to 
confidentiality that may occur in certain dispute settings particularly those arising in the context of 
the co-mingling of mediation with formal civil justice processes. The article will conclude by drawing 
together the arguments presented throughout the work.  
The practical importance of confidentiality  
The need for confidentiality in mediation is important for a number of theoretical reasons, most 
pertinently related to party perceptions about not only who is protected during the mediation 
process, but how such protection extends to disclosures made, and documents produced, during 
that process.28  From the perspective of the parties, it is well established that in order for parties to 
ĚŝƐĐůŽƐĞƉĞƌƚŝŶĞŶƚŝŶĨŽƌŵĂƚŝŽŶƚŽƚŚĞŵĞĚŝĂƚŽƌ ?ŝŶĐůƵĚŝŶŐŝŶĨŽƌŵĂƚŝŽŶǁŚŝĐŚŝƐ ‘ĐƌŝƚŝĐĂůůǇŝŵƉŽƌƚĂŶƚ Q
in order to resolve ƚŚĞĐŽŶĨůŝĐƚ ? ?29 those parties must feel confident that the mediator is bound to 
maintain confidentiality in respect of such disclosures.30 Indeed, the issue may go beyond being 
simply a matter of trust in the process or facilitating the operation of that process, but also contain 
implications in terms of the role of the mediator.  Mediation does not create a legally binding 
obligation to abide by any decisions reached during the process, but instead enables the parties to 
negotiate a mutually beneficial outcome, through the mediator.31  It has been suggested that where 
the mediator is not compelled to maintain confidentiality, but may disclose information received 
during a mediation to courts in the future settlement of any dispute, then the fundamental role of 
the mediator is altered from being a neutral third party who aims simply to facilitate a particular 
dispute between parties,32 to containing aspects akin to the role of a judge during litigation. It is true 
that the mere fact that a mediator may be compelled to disclose information in certain 
circumstances does not of itself lead to such a change in role, after all there is nothing to suggest 
that a simple disclosure may prevent a mediator from being impartial during the mediation itself.33  
However, it is also true that the aim of mediation is to facilitate the making of the decision by the 
parties,34 and therefore it is argued that if a mediator is not bound by confidentiality and can be 
required to disclose information to a court which will subsequently enforce a decision on those 
parties, the mediator is acting, not to facilitate a negotiation, but to facilitate the imposition of a 
legally binding decision on those parties. On this basis, it is suggested that action which may 
undermine self-determination ?ŚĞƌĞ ?ƚŚĞĂďƐĞŶĐĞŽĨĐŽŶĨŝĚĞŶƚŝĂůŝƚǇ ?ŵĂǇƚŚĞƌĞĨŽƌĞ ?ĨƌŽŵƚŚĞƉĂƌƚŝĞƐ ?
perspective, prevent the mediator from being a neutral third party, thus rendering mediation a less 
attractive choice35.   
                                                          
28 <<ŽǀĂĐŚ ? ‘dŚĞǀŽůƵƚŝŽŶŽĨDĞĚŝĂƚŝŽŶŝŶƚŚĞhŶŝƚĞĚ^ƚĂƚĞƐ P/ƐƐƵĞƐZŝƉĞĨŽƌZĞŐƵůĂƚŝŽŶDĂǇ^ŚĂƉĞƚŚĞ&ƵƚƵƌĞŽĨWƌĂĐƚŝĐĞ ?
in N Alexander, Global Trends in Mediation (Second Edition, Kluwer International Publishing 2006) 439 
29 <^,ŽďďƐ ? ‘DĞĚŝĂƚŝŽŶŽŶĨŝĚĞŶƚŝĂůŝƚǇĂŶĚŶĨŽƌĐĞĂďůĞ ^ĞƚƚůĞŵĞŶƚƐ PĞĂůŽƌEŽĞĂů ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ) ?ŽŶůŝŶĞǀĞƌƐŝŽŶŶƉ )ĂǀĂŝůĂďůĞ
at http://www.mediate.com/articles/hobbsk1.cfm accessed 24/3/2016 
30 ibid 
31 Blanke (n2) R11 
32 ,ƐƚŽƌ ? ‘DĞĚŝĂƚŽƌEĞƵƚƌĂůŝƚǇ PDĂŬŝŶŐ^ĞŶƐĞŽĨdŚĞŽƌǇĂŶĚWƌĂĐƚŝĐĞ ? ? ? ? ? ? )S&LS 16(2) 221-239, passim 
33 ^DĂƵ ? ‘ƌďŝƚƌĂƚŝŽŶƚŽDĞĚŝĂƚŝŽŶǁŝƚŚƌďŝƚƌĂƚŝŽŶƚŽƚŚĞ^ĂŵĞWĂƌƚŝĞƐŝŶƚŚĞ^ĂŵĞ/ŶƚĞƌŶĂƚŝŽŶĂůŽŵŵĞƌĐŝĂůŝƐƉƵƚĞ
ĞĨŽƌĞƚŚĞ^ĂŵĞEĞƵƚƌĂů P/ŶŶŽǀĂƚŝǀĞǀŽůƵƚŝŽŶŽƌZĞĐŝƉĞĨŽƌŝƐĂƐƚĞƌ ? ? ? ? ? ? )Cons LJ 31(3) 429-436, 434 
34 ^^ŚŝƉŵĂŶ ? ‘ŽŵƉƵůƐŽƌǇDĞĚŝĂƚŝŽŶ PdŚĞůĞƉŚĂŶƚŝŶƚŚĞZŽŽŵ ? ? ? ? ? ? )CJQ 30(2) 163-191, 171 
35 Of course it should be noted that in some circumstances parties may feel de facto bound to enter into mediation given 
the operation by courts of cost sanctions for  ‘ƵŶƌĞĂƐŽŶĂďůĞ ?ƌĞĨƵƐĂůƐƚŽŵĞĚŝĂƚĞƵŶĚĞƌƚŚĞŐĞŶĞƌĂůŵĂŶĚĂƚĞ ŽŵĂŶĂŐĞ
cases effectively by way of Civil Procedural Rules, r 3.1.  For some recent cases see PGF II SA v OMFS Co [2013] EWCA Civ 
78; Rolf v De Guerin [2011] EWCA Civ 78.  In view of the lack of choice in entering the process, it can be argued that the gap 
Confidentiality: An Elusive Concept? 
It should be noted that there is no accepted definition of confidentiality as it pertains to mediation, 
and it must therefore be asked whether there is any generally held consensus about what a 
confidential process comprises in this context. The starting point is to observe the comments of 
Bartlett who (in the context of English general civil mediation) has noted that confidentiality in 
ŵĞĚŝĂƚŝŽŶ ŵĂǇ ƉĞƌƚĂŝŶ ƚŽ  ‘ĐŽŶƚƌĂĐƚƵĂů ĐŽŶĨŝĚĞŶƚŝĂůŝƚǇ ? ůĞŐĂů ƉƌŽĨĞƐƐŝŽŶĂů ƉƌŝǀŝůĞŐĞ ĂŶĚ ƚŚĞ ƌĞůĂƚĞĚ
privilege arising from Without Prejudice negotŝĂƚŝŽŶƐ ? ?36 In other specific contexts mediation 
confidentiality may arise from specific legislative provisions which apply to the process37.   
As Tumbridge asserts, in terms of assessing the significance of confidentiality, one must ask whether 
ƚŚĞŶĂƚƵƌĞŽĨƚŚĂƚ ‘ĐŽŶĨŝĚĞŶƚŝĂůŝƚǇŝƐĂďƐŽůƵƚĞ ?38 or whether there are circumstances, such as in terms 
of subsequent litigation,39 which may require disclosure. These circumstances will be considered 
further below but it should be observed here that it is clear that the nature of confidentiality in the 
mediation process may vary depending on the nature of the dispute in question and any subsequent 
litigation which may arise.40 Whilst this appears to be somewhat axiomatic when one considers that 
mediation is inherently flexible and is simply a forum through which parties may negotiate their own 
solutions to a dispute,41 it is difficult to reconcile with the views of some commentators who have 
described the nature of confidentiality, in all disputes. In this regard, Brooker describes 
ĐŽŶĨŝĚĞŶƚŝĂůŝƚǇ ŝŶ ŵĞĚŝĂƚŝŽŶ ĂƐ ďĞŝŶŐ ŽŶĞ ŽĨ ƚŚĞ  ‘ƉŚŝůŽƐŽƉŚŝĐĂů ƚĞŶĞƚƐ ?42 of the mediation process 
while Zamboni goes further and suggests that cŽŶĨŝĚĞŶƚŝĂůŝƚǇ ŝƐ ŶŽƚ ŽŶůǇ  ‘ŬĞǇ ƚŽ ƚŚĞ ƐƵĐĐĞƐƐĨƵů
ƉƌĂĐƚŝĐĞŽĨZƉƌŽĐĞĚƵƌĞƐǁŽƌůĚǁŝĚĞ ?43 but is also one of the predominant reasons cited by parties 
for choosing mediation as their preferred mechanism of dispute settlement.44 It is interesting to note 
that in this regard, Zamboni goes on to observe that confidentiality, rather than simply being a 
feature of mediation, is instead an inherent part of the process,45 that process itself being flexible in 
order to enable the mutually beneficial solutions discussed above,46 to be reached.  If confidentiality 
is to be considered not separate to the process of mediation itself, but rather as an inherent part of 
a flexible process,47 it seems reasonable to assume that confidentiality may operate with flexibility, 
and indeed have a different significance, depending on the nature of the particular dispute. This 
issue will be explored in more detail below.  Here, it should simply be noted that at first glance the 
fact that confidentiality may be treated differently in different disputes may not of itself be 
problematic, but instead be considered as simply indicative of the arguments outlined above that 
the mediation process facilitates the flexible resolution of disputes by providing a forum which is 
able to meet the individual needs of the parties.48 However, it is suggested here that this must be 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
between theory and practice in terms of mediation confidentiality has an even greater resonance in terms of fair treatment 
of the parties. 
36 DĂƌƚůĞƚƚ ? ‘DĞĚŝĂƚŝŽŶ^ĞĐƌĞƚƐŝŶƚŚĞ^ŚĂĚŽǁŽĨƚŚĞ>Ăǁ ? ? ? ? ? ? )CJQ 34(1) 112-126, 112-126, footnote 1 
37 Including in respect of EU cross border disputes and family mediation in Scotland.  These are discussed below. 
38 Tumbridge (n25) 145 
39 ibid 
40 Bartlett (n36) 112 
41 Blanke (n2) R11 
42 Brooker (n6) 185 
43 DĂŵďŽŶŝ ? ‘ŽŶĨŝĚĞŶƚŝĂůŝƚǇŝŶDĞĚŝĂƚŝŽŶ ? ? ? ? ? ? )Int ALR 6(5) 175-190, 175 
44 ibid 
45 ibid at footnote 1 
46 Blanke (n2) R11 
47 Zamboni (n43) footnote 1 
48 Brooker (n6) 5-6 
balanced by the need to ensure certainty and confidence in the process, and it can be argued that 
the lack of a definition about what a confidential mediation process entails or indeed when 
confidentiality will apply as part of that process, reduces certainty for the parties, and therefore may 
of itself undermine the likelihood of the process being considered successful.  
Again, further discussion will be provided below, but first it is prudent to observe that 
notwithstanding that divergences in approaches towards, and beliefs about, the nature of 
confidentiality, the very fact that mediation is described as being a confidential process may mean 
that parties will be likely to anticipate that confidentiality will be achieved in that process.49 As such, 
it is suggested that any lack of confidentiality, which will be shown below to result in practice, may 
ŶŽƚ ŚĂǀĞ Ă ƐŝŐŶŝĨŝĐĂŶƚ ŝŵƉĂĐƚ ƵƉŽŶ ƚŚĞ ƉĂƌƚŝĞƐ ?choice to use mediation, at least not initially50. 
Rather, parties may believe that confidentiality will be ensured due to the process being described in 
theory as being confidential.51 This belief may be further bolstered by the drafting of a mediation 
contract between the parties and the mediator,52 although it will be shown below that the absence 
of such a contract does not of itself mean that the process is not confidential to one degree or 
another.  Problems with confidentiality or lack thereof may, thus, only come to light after the initial 
mediation has taken place, and thus its importance in practice as a factor in parties choosing the 
process may be overstated.  Although confidentiality is often cited as important to parties when 
choosing to continue negotiations through mediation, it is suggested that this is because of a belief 
and theoretical arguments that mediation is inherently a confidential process, and therefore the 
choice to enter mediation assumes that such confidentiality will be achieved. 
One is, therefore, might argue that confidentiality, rather than simply being important in terms of 
achieving successful mediation processes, is such an inherent part of mediation itself, that if 
confidentiality cannot be achieved, then mediation properly so-called cannot be exercised, at least 
not successfully.  /ŶĚĞĞĚĂƐ^ŽŽŽďƐĞƌǀĞƐ ?ǁŚĞƌĞ ‘ŝƐƐƵĞƐĂƌĞƐĞŶƐŝƚŝǀĞ ?ŝŶǀŽůǀŝŶŐƐĞŶŝŽƌŵĂŶĂŐĞŵĞŶƚ ?
ĚŝƐĐůŽƐƵƌĞŽĨƚƌĂĚĞƐĞĐƌĞƚƐŽƌƐĞŶƐŝƚŝǀĞĚŽĐƵŵĞŶƚƐ QĐŽŶĨŝĚĞŶƚŝĂůŝƚǇ ?ŝƐ ?ĂƉƌŝŵĞĐŽŶƐŝĚĞƌĂƚŝŽŶ ?53 and 
the increased need for such confidentiality may result in the failure of the particular mediation.54 
One does not seek to contend that such assertions are incorrect; it is certainly true that where 
information is particularly sensitive there may be an increased need not only for confidentiality, but 
for trust that the mediator and other party will maintain such confidentiality,55 as part of the process 
itself.  Rather, we would add that if the very need for a confidential process, rather than simply there 
being a lack of confidentiality in a particular instance, may be a contraindication for the use of 
mediation, this may undermine the ostensible benefits of mediation, as outlined in the introduction 
to this work.  
                                                          
49 <^ĐŽƚƚ ? ‘ůƚĞƌŶĂƚŝǀĞƐƚŽ>ŝƚŝŐĂƚŝŽŶ PWĂƌƚ ? W ZĂŶĚDĞĚŝĂƚŝŽŶ ? ? ? ? ? ? )ELBLB Apr 9-12, 9 
50 Except for repeat players who find that their expectations in this sense transpired to be unfounded 
51 ibid 
52 K Mackie, D Miles, W Marsh and T Allen, ADR Practice Guide: Commercial Dispute Resolution (Third Edition, Tottel 
Publishing 2007) 113 
53 G Soo ? ‘tŽƌŬŝŶŐdŚƌŽƵŐŚhŶǁŽƌŬĂďůĞDĞĚŝĂƚŝŽŶ ? ? ? ? ? ? )Arbitration 66(3) 207-210, 210 
54 ibid 
55 ZƵƌŶůĞǇĂŶĚ'>ĂƐĐĞůůĞƐ ? ‘DĞĚŝĂƚŽƌŽŶĨŝĚĞŶƚŝĂůŝƚǇ PŽŶĚƵĐƚĂŶĚŽŵŵƵŶŝĐĂƚŝŽŶƐ ? ? ? ? ? ? )Arbitration 70(1) 28-36, 28 
 Without Prejudice  W The Privilege 
As noted above parties may believe that the nature of the proceedings will be confidential on the 
basis of the mediation contract drafted between them and the mediator.56 Of course any apparent 
protection this may offer to the parƚŝĞƐŵƵƐƚ ďĞ ďĂůĂŶĐĞĚ ďǇ ƚŚĞ ŶŽƚŝŽŶ ƚŚĂƚ   ‘ŐĞŶĞƌĂůůǇ ƐƉĞĂŬŝŶŐ
confidentiality is not a bar to disclosure of documents or information in the process of litigation, but 
the court will only compel such disclosure if it considers it necessary for the fair disposal of the 
ĐĂƐĞ ? ?57 Indeed, one may state such a position as being objectively certain in the context of English 
civil mediation due to the fact that it has been endorsed by the judiciary in Farm Assist Ltd (In 
Liquidation) v The Secretary of State for the Environment, Food and Rural Affairs (No2),58 in which 
Ramsey J held that the parties own agreement as to confidentiality will not be the deciding factor in 
whether information received during a mediation will in fact be considered confidential.59   
In practice, the requirement of confidentiality in mediation may be covered through the operation of 
the Without Prejudice rules.60 These rules must be distinguished from rules relating to confidentiality 
per se.  Ɛ ƌŽŽŬĞƌ ŽďƐĞƌǀĞƐ ?  ‘ĂůƚŚŽƵŐŚ ŵĞĚŝĂƚŝŽŶ ŝƐ ŽĨƚĞŶendorsed on the grounds of its 
confidentiality, legal protection for the statements in mediation in common law countries has been 
ĨŽƌƚŚĞŵŽƐƚƉĂƌƚƚŚƌŽƵŐŚĂŶĂƉƉůŝĐĂƚŝŽŶŽĨƚŚĞtŝƚŚŽƵƚWƌĞũƵĚŝĐĞƌƵůĞƐ ? ?61  Therefore, although the 
operation of the Without Prejudice rules may effectively render information disclosed in a mediation 
confidential, this does not mean that Without Prejudice rules should be considered synonymous 
with information being confidential, but rather that they operate to encourage parties in dispute to 
speak candidly with a view to reaching settlement in then knowledge that their disclosures will not 
be used against them in any later court proceedings.  The parties can and often do declare that 
disclosures will be protected by the Without Prejudice rules in the mediation contract, but in the 
absence of such a clause, the rules may still operate according to the common law test, which will be 
discussed shortly.62 However, it is submitted that whilst this appears to confirm the effective 
confidentiality of the mediation process, in form if not in name, it should also be noted that even 
where the parties have declared that the Without Prejudice rules apply, if it is later shown that the 
test has not been fulfilled, the wording of the contract may effectively be meaningless.  Again, it is 
argued that this represents the confusion which may surround the law of confidentiality as it relates 
to mediation, as parties cannot rely on the wording of the mediation contract in order to be certain 
that confidentiality will apply.  
This problem notwithstanding, where the Without Prejudice rules do apply, the parties may be 
certain that disclosures will not be able to be used in any subsequent litigation, and may thus seem 
to be a confirmation of the benefits of mediation as a means of negotiating a settlement, in terms of 
enabling parties to reach an agreement which will facilitate a continued relationship without the 
                                                          
56 Soo (n53) 210. Confidentiality clauses are of course commonplace in commercial mediation agreements.  See for 
example, the CEDR Model Mediation Agreement (2016) available at http://uk.practicallaw.com/0-584-6305 
57 C Phipps and R Toulson, Confidentiality (Second Edition, Sweet & Maxwell 2006) 17-016 
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59 ibid 
60 Phipps and Toulson (n57) 17-016 
61 Brooker (n6) 187 
62 ibid 
concern that disclosures may be used in litigation.63  Indeed, one may be inclined to take such an 
argument further and observe that if mediation is successful as a result of the confidential nature of 
proceedings, albeit under the Without Prejudice rules, there will be no need for litigation and thus, 
theoretically at least, the issues with a lack of confidentiality64 may not arise.  Support for such an 
argument may be taken from the assertions of Oliver LJ in Cutts v Head,65 in which he observed that, 
 ‘ƉĂƌƚŝĞƐƐŚŽƵůĚďĞĞŶĐŽƵƌĂŐĞĚĂƐĨĂƌĂƐƉŽƐƐŝďůĞƚŽƐĞƚƚůĞƚŚĞŝƌĚŝƐƉƵƚĞƐǁŝƚŚŽƵƚƌĞƐŽƌƚƚŽůŝƚŝŐĂƚŝon 
and should not be discouraged by the knowledge that anything that is said in the course of such 
ŶĞŐŽƚŝĂƚŝŽŶƐĐŽƵůĚďĞƵƐĞĚƚŽƚŚĞŝƌƉƌĞũƵĚŝĐĞŝŶƚŚĞĐŽƵƌƐĞŽĨƚŚĞƉƌŽĐĞĞĚŝŶŐƐ ?.66  It seems to us that 
it is only a logical extension of such assertions to observe that where proceedings are not 
confidential, and thus as shown above, less likely to be successful, disclosures may be revealed in 
future litigation, and therefore lead to the position where parties do not choose mediation as a 
dispute settlement forum. We do recognise that such arguments are somewhat circular in nature, 
but it is argued that this demonstrates the inherent problems with confidentiality in mediation: its 
operation is surrounded with uncertainty and confusion67 which may in turn undermine the very 
nature of mediation as a means of dispute settlement.  
It is clear from the decision in Rush and Tompkins Ltd v Greater London Council,68 the facts of which 
are not important for the discussion here, that the Without Prejudice rules will be applicable in 
mediation as a matter of public policy in terms of encouraging parties to settle disputes without 
litigation,69 thus confirming the principle outlined in Cutts v Head, above.  The limitations of these 
rules are laid bare here, however.   It was made clear in Rush that the question of whether 
disclosures will actually be considered Without Prejudice rests not on the assertions of the parties, 
but instead on the considerations of whether the particular disclosures were made in a genuine 
attempt to reach a settlement, rather than mere disclosures which happened to be made during the 
process of a mediation.70  As Lord Griffiths held, if it is clear from the surrounding circumstances that 
the parties were seĞŬŝŶŐƚŽĐŽŵƉƌŽŵŝƐĞĂŶĂĐƚŝŽŶ ?ƚŚĞŶƚŚĞĐŽŶƚĞŶƚŽĨƚŚŽƐĞŶĞŐŽƚŝĂƚŝŽŶƐ ?71 will not 
be admissible.   Implicit in this statement, however, is that where it is clear that the negotiations 
ǁĞƌĞŶŽƚƉĂƌƚŽĨƐƵĐŚĂ ‘ŐĞŶƵŝŶĞ ?72 attempt to resolve the dispute, the Without Prejudice rules will 
not apply and any disclosures will consequently not be confidential.73 
So it may be that parties will not be certain before making any disclosures how those disclosures will 
subsequently be treated. It is argued that this position introduces a further element of confusion 
into the process: in order to determine whether a communication should be protected by privilege 
in such a circumstance, it will inevitably be necessary to consider whether the communication was 
indeed a genuine attempt to settle the dispute or whether it was simply an admission of fact or part 
                                                          
63 :&ƌǇ ? ‘tŝƚŚŽƵƚWƌĞũƵĚŝĐĞĂŶĚŽŶĨŝĚĞŶƚŝĂůŽŵŵƵŶŝĐĂƚŝŽŶƐŝŶ/ŶƚĞƌŶĂƚŝŽŶĂůƌďŝƚƌĂƚŝŽŶ ?tŚĞŶŽĞƐWƌŽĐĞĚƵƌĂů
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65 Cutts v Head [1984] Ch 290 
66 ibid at [306] 
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DŝŶŶĞƐŽƚĂ ? ? ? ? ? ? )Hamline Journal of Public Law and Policy 18 329, 330 
68 Rush and Tompkins Ltd v Greater London Council [1989] AC 1280  
69 ibid per Lord Griffiths at [1299] 
70 ibid  
71 ibid 
72 ibid at [1305] 
73 ƌĞĐĞŶƚĐĂƐĞŝŶǁŚŝĐŚƚŚĞŽƵƌƚŽĨƉƉĞĂůƐƵƉƉŽƌƚĞĚĂďƌŽĂĚĞƌŝŶƚĞƌƉƌĞƚĂƚŝŽŶŽĨǁŚĂƚŝƐŵĞĂŶƚďǇĂ ‘ŐĞŶƵŝŶĞ ?ĂƚƚĞŵƉƚ
to settle Suh v Mace (UK) Limited [2016] EWCA Civ 4. 
of an open discussion within a mediation. It seems to us that such a determination could only be 
made by a court, and that in order to avoid the somewhat circular situation whereby the court must 
consider the content of the communication in order to consider the disclosure, an objective view 
must be taken of the circumstances in which the communication was made.74 It is, therefore, 
submitted that the confidentiality of mediation appears to be comprehensive only where the 
outcome of mediation is successful and there is no need for further disputes pertaining to whether 
disclosures made during the process should be admissible in subsequent litigation. Further, whilst it 
may indeed be the case that such decisions pertaining to admissibility remain procedural issues, and 
do not undermine the confidentiality of discussions within a mediation unless it is determined that 
such disclosures should be admissible, it is submitted that the mere making of such determinations 
will involve a significant cost. This may, therefore, undermine one of the supposed benefits of 
mediation: significantly reduced costs when compared to traditional litigation.75   
Privilege: Scope and Exceptions. UnderminiŶŐWĂƌƚŝĞƐ ?ǆƉĞĐƚĂƚŝŽŶƐ ?
A related question relates to the scope of the Without Prejudice privilege.  It is clear from the 
decision in Unilever v The Procter and Gamble76 that the scope of the privilege is very wide and 
indeed commentators in the past observed that this may prevent the problem, described above, 
whereby a court will be required to undertake an examination of the mediation proceedings and any 
disclosures in order to determine the nature of those disclosures.77  As Willoughby has observed, if 
the scope of the Without Prejudice rule were not to be considered widely, parties may feel uncertain 
as to the scope of the protection they would receive under it, and thus the public policy of 
encouraging negotiations, as expressed in Cutts v Head, would be undermined.78 Indeed, this would 
ůĞĂĚ ƚŽ  ‘ŝŵŵĞŶƐĞ ƉƌĂĐƚŝĐĂů ĚŝĨĨŝĐƵůƚŝĞƐ  ?ƐƵĐŚ ĂƐ ƚŚĂƚ ƐĞƚƚůĞŵĞŶƚ ĚŝƐĐƵƐƐŝŽŶƐ ǁŽƵůĚ ŚĂǀĞ ƚŽ ďĞ
ƵŶƌĞĂůŝƐƚŝĐĂůůǇŐƵĂƌĚĞĚ ) ? ?79  
This notwithstanding, leaving aside the issue of whether a particular disclosure is viewed as part of a 
genuine attempt to settle or not, there are a number of recognised exceptions to the application of 
the Without Prejudice rules, and it must therefore be asked whether the very existence of such 
exceptions may lead to problems in terms of either tŚĞ ƉĂƌƚŝĞƐ ? ĐŚŽŝĐĞ ƚŽ ŵĞĚŝĂƚĞ ? Žƌ ƚŽ
circumstances in which a party may find itself unwittingly exposed.  These exceptions have been 
articulated most notably in Unilever, although it should be noted that the facts of Unilever related 
specifically to whether the Without Prejudice rules could apply not only to disclosures which might 
unfavourably influence the position of one of the parties, but also to threats made by one party to 
bring litigious proceedings against the other in the absence of a successful mediation.80  The threats 
made in this case should be distinguished from a mere assertion that although the attempt to solve 
the dispute through mediation was genuine, that party would still rely on their rights to access court 
to seek a resolution; instead the threats to bring such an action in this case appeared to be contrary 
to section 70(1) of the Patents Act 1977.81  dŚŝƐƐĞĐƚŝŽŶƉƌŽǀŝĚĞƐƚŚĂƚ ? ‘ǁŚĞƌĞĂƉĞƌƐŽŶďǇĐŝƌĐƵůĂƌƐ ?
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78 ibid 
79 ibid 
80 Unilever (n92) per Robert Walker LJ at [2437]-[2438] 
81 Section 70(1) Patents Act 1977 
advertisements or otherwise, threatens another person with proceedings for any infringements of a 
patent [that person] may [subject to certain conditions] bring proceedings in the courts against the 
ƉĞƌƐŽŶŵĂŬŝŶŐƚŚĞƚŚƌĞĂƚƐ ? ?82  Although accepting that there was a distinction between statements 
made contrary to the Act and general statements protected by the Without Prejudice rule, which 
ŵĂǇďĞĂŶĂĚŵŝƐƐŝŽŶĂƐƚŽŽŶĞƉĂƌƚǇ ?ƐĐŽŶĚƵĐƚĂŶĚŵĂǇďĞŚĂƌŵĨƵůƚŽƚŚĂƚƉĂƌƚǇŝŶĂŶǇƐƵďƐĞƋƵĞŶƚ
litigation, it was held to make such a distinction would lead to uncertainty about the scope of the 
privilege, and thus undermine the public policy of ensuring that parties to a mediation could make 
unguarded disclosures with a view to reaching a mutually beneficial settlement.83  This would appear 
to support the proposition that the Privilege is wide and operates to ensure confidentiality to parties 
in mediation.   
Nonetheless, Robert Walker LJ did go on to observe that a number of exceptions to the principle do 
exist.  It was held that where there is doubt over whether an agreement has been reached, 
disclosure is permissible.84 Disclosure may also occur in cases of misrepresentation, fraud, undue 
influence,85 estoppel86 ŽƌǁŚĞƌĞƚŚĞƌĞŚĂƐďĞĞŶ ‘ƵŶĂŵďŝŐƵŽƵƐŝŵƉƌŽƉƌŝĞƚǇ ? ?87  Disclosures may also 
be made to explain delay,88 to provide evidence as to whether a  ‘ĐůĂŝŵĂŶƚŚĂƐĂĐƚĞĚƌĞĂƐŽŶĂďůǇĂƐƚŽ
ŚŝƐ ůŽƐƐ ŝŶĐŽŶĚƵĐƚ ?89 or in making an assessment of costs.90  Although this list is rather extensive, 
suggesting at first glance that this spate of caveats may undermine the public policy of ensuring that 
parties are able to make full disclosures, not only are the exceptions clear and defined, but it can be 
argued they all relate to some form of impropriety which it would be unconscionable to protect.  As 
such, it is suggested that the Unilever exceptions, rather than undermining the scope of the Without 
Prejudice rules, and therefore constituting a circumstance in which mediating parties may face 
issues with confidentiality, are simply an example of the judicial system not permitting parties to use 
the law to promote their own misdeeds.91 
As a final point here, it should be noted that as Mr Justice Briggs has observed, there is some doubt 
as to whether the privilege operates strictly for any purposes but subject to the above exceptions, or 
whether it should be viewed a more of limited principle subject to further exception  ‘protecting 
statements made without prejudice from being used as admissions of the truth of what is stated ? ?92 
Whilst it is true that there is some authority for the latter position, as may be found in Muller v 
Linsley & Mortimer,93 the decision in Unliver was approved in Ofulue v Bossert.94 As Lord Neuberger 
observed, not only would it be  ‘ŝŶĂƉƉƌŽƉƌŝĂƚĞ to create further ĞǆĐĞƉƚŝŽŶƐ ? ?95 but what is required is 
a practical approach whereby the Without Prejudice rules should always apply unless the disclosures 
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91 OJ Herstein ? ‘EŽƌŵĂƚŝǀĞdŚĞŽƌǇŽĨƚŚĞůĞĂŶ,ĂŶĚƐĞĨĞŶƐĞ ? ? ? ? ? ? )Cornell University Law School Publications 1-139, 1, 
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93 Muller v Linsley & Mortimer [1996] PNLR 74 
94 Ofulue v Bossert [2009] 2 ALL ER(D) 119 
95 ibid per Lord Neuberger at [98] 
were  ‘ǁŚŽůůǇ unconnected with the ƉĂƌƚŝĞƐ ? ?96  It is argued that this confirms the need for certainty in 
the application of the privilege and confirms that parties will be protected from disclosures, thus 
maintaining confidentiality of mediation, even if that confidentiality is secured by the operation of 
the Without Prejudice rules, rather than confidentiality per se as contained in the mediation 
contract.    
It has been shown above that although confidentiality in mediation is an inherent part of the 
process, it is a concept ripe with confusion and uncertainty. Although this may seem to undermine 
ƚŚĞƉĂƌƚŝĞƐ ?ĐŽŶƚƌĂĐƚƵĂůƉƌŽǀŝƐŝŽŶƐƌĞŐĂƌĚŝŶŐĐŽŶĨŝĚĞŶƚŝĂůŝƚǇƚŚĞtŝƚŚŽƵƚWƌĞũƵĚŝĐĞƌƵůĞƐŵĂǇŽƉĞƌĂƚĞ
as something akin to a saviour of the concept.  It does seem that the scope of these rules is rather 
wide, and that this may prevent problems which may arise if parties are unsure whether their 
disclosures are protected. As such, parties may still be encouraged to choose mediation as a forum 
in which to settle their disputes.  So whilst confidentiality itself may be an elusive concept, in theory 
at least, privacy may be protected through the Without Prejudice Privilege.  Whilst in theory, this 
does not appear to cause problems for parties in terms of their need to make full and frank 
disclosures during mediations which lead to the successful outcome of those processes, one must 
ask therefore whether a lack of confidentiality in mediation may still cause problems in practice. 
The Practical Application of the Without Prejudice Rules in mediation 
While there have been a spate of recent cases in England in which exceptions to the without 
prejudice privilege in mediation have been seen to take effect97 here we focus on the practical 
difficulties that may arise in practice with operation of the Without Prejudice rules in mediation, in 
cases concerning documents produced ostensibly for the purposes of mediation rather than in terms 
of mere disclosures. 98 The starting point here is to consider Aird v Prime Meridian.99 Briefly, the case 
involved proceedings related to the construction of a house, during which the parties were referred 
to mediation.100 The mediation was not successful, and upon the recommencement of proceedings, 
the defendants sought to include the joint statements of experts which had been used as part of the 
mediation.101 The claimants asserted that such statements were covered by privilege as part of the 
confidential nature of mediation, and were thus inadmissible.102 At first instance, it was held that the 
expert statements were privileged for all purposes notwithstanding the fact that they were 
produced pursuant to Rule 35.12(3) of the Civil Procedure Rules.103  It should be observed that the 
decision took place in the context of a mediation which occurred during the litigation, and indeed 
Judge Coulson asserted that it was typical of the problems which may occur when these processes 
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97 Where both parties waived their privilege to what occurred in mediation the court in Earl of Malmesbury v Strutt and 
Parker [2008] EWHC 424 (QB) held that where a party acted in an unreasonable fashion in the mediation that party may be 
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despite a non-compellability clause to the contrary.  In Cattley v Pollard 2007 Ch 353.parties to mediation were ordered to 
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level of damages in a subsequent case. Finally, in Brown v Patel [2007] EWHC 625ƚŚĞĐŽƵƌƚĂůůŽǁĞĚĞǀŝĚĞŶĐĞŽĨƉĂƌƚŝĞƐ ?
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98 důĂĐŬĞƌ ? ‘dŚĞŽŽŵĞƌĂŶŐĨĨĞĐƚ ? ? ? ? ? ? )Building 26 69, passim 
99 Aird v Prime Meridian [2006] EWHC 2338 
100 ibid per HH Judge Peter Coulson QC at [3] 
101 ibid 
102 ibid 
103 Rule 35.12(3) of the Civil Procedure Rules (Current version in force since 2009) 
become intertwined: he argueĚ ƚŚĂƚ ƚŚŝƐ ŵĂǇ ůĞĂĚ ƚŽ  ‘ĚŝƐƉƵƚĞƐ ŽǀĞƌ ƚŚĞ ĞǆƚĞŶƚ ĂŶĚ ĞĨĨĞĐƚ ŽĨ ƚŚĞ
ŽƌĚĞƌƐ ŽĨ ƚŚĞ ĐŽƵƌƚ ? ?104 and thus lead to confusion between the extent to which documents used 
during the mediation process are in fact confidential.  However, reversing the decision in the Court 
of Appeal,105 DĂǇ>:ŽďƐĞƌǀĞĚƚŚĂƚǁŚĞƌĞĚŽĐƵŵĞŶƚƐ ‘ǁĞƌĞŽďǀŝŽƵƐůǇƉƌŽĚƵĐĞĚĨŽƌŽƚŚĞƌƉƵƌƉŽƐĞƐ ?
ǁŚŝĐŚǁĞƌĞŶĞĞĚĞĚĨŽƌĂŶĚƉƌŽĚƵĐĞĚĂƚƚŚĞŵĞĚŝĂƚŝŽŶ ? ?106 confidentiality would not apply. He went 
ŽŶ ƚŽ ŽďƐĞƌǀĞ ƚŚĂƚ  ‘ĚŽĐƵŵĞŶƚƐ ƉƌŽǀŝĚĞĚ ĨŽƌ ŵĞĚŝĂƚŝŽŶ ĂƌĞŶŽƌmally privileged and that privilege 
ƐŚŽƵůĚ ŶŽƚ ďĞ ǁĂŝǀĞĚ Žƌ ŽƚŚĞƌǁŝƐĞ ůŽƐƚ ? ŽƚŚĞƌ ƚŚĂŶ ŝŶ ĐůĞĂƌ Žƌ ƵŶĞƋƵŝǀŽĐĂů ĐŝƌĐƵŵƐƚĂŶĐĞƐ ?107 but 
argued that these circumstances were fulfilled because the documents were clearly produced under 
Rule 35.12(3), even though those documents were additionally available during the mediation.108  He 
continued that the question to be considered is not whether originally privileged documents could 
have that privilege removed, and thus become admissible in litigation, but whether the documents 
were in fact privileged in the first place.109  Judge Coulson, at first instance,110 was wrong in this 
respect111 and the decision was overturned.   
While we do not seek to contend that May LJ was misguided in terms of his analysis of the nature of 
the Privilege; it would indeed be nonsensical to assert that non-Privileged documents could simply 
become Privileged due to the fact that they were subsequently used in mediation; it is argued that 
the result of the Court of Appeal decision is problematic in terms of the practical significance of 
confidentiality in mediation.  Whilst it was true that the Court in Aird, had ordered the statements to 
be produced,112 and they were not thus disclosures of the type normally made in mediation, the 
parties were instructed to undertake mediation as part of the litigation process and in doing this, the 
parties believed that such a process was confidential. It has been argued, therefore, that the fact 
that the statements had been produced under orders of the court, and thus not directly as part of 
the mediation should be irrelevant.113 The fact remains that the parties were instructed to undertake 
a confidential process in order that they may reach a mutually beneficial solution,114 and it therefore 
seems contrary to the public policy to encourage candour in negotiations to assert that documents 
used as part of that process, could subsequently be used in litigation.  It is, therefore, argued that 
DĂǇ>: ?ƐĂƐƐĞƌƚŝŽŶƐ ?ǁŚŝůƐƚƚĞĐŚŶŝĐĂůůǇĐŽƌƌĞĐƚ ?ĨŽĐƵƐƌĂƚŚĞƌƚŽŽŵƵĐŚŽŶƚŚĞƚĞĐŚŶŝcal origins of the 
statements,115 rather than considering the public policy reasons behind the decision to refer parties 
to mediation.116 It is further suggested that this demonstrates that that there is a clear gap between 
the public policy assertions in Unilever117 and indeed the ostensibly wide scope of the Without 
Prejudice rules averred in that case, and the practical application of those rules when related to the 
production of documents which are used in mediation.  
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110 Aird (99) per Coulson J at [36] 
111 Aird (n105) per May LJ at [29] 
112 Aird (n99) per HH Judge Peter Coulson at [2] 
113 ĚŝƚŽƌ ? ‘Z PtŝƚŚŽƵƚWƌĞũƵĚŝĐĞWƌŝǀŝůĞŐĞŝŶDĞĚŝĂƚŝŽŶ ? ? ? ? ? ? )ARB LM Apr 10-12, passim 
114 Aird (n99) per HH Judge Coulson QC at [1]-[5] 
115 ĚŝƚŽƌ ? ‘ĂƐĞŽŵŵĞŶƚ PŝƐĐƵƐƐŝŽŶĞƚǁĞĞŶǆƉĞƌƚƐĂŶĚDĞĚŝĂƚŝŽŶ ? ? ? ? ? ? )CPN 2(Feb)7, 7 
116 ,ZƵŶĚĂƐ ? ‘tŚĞŶŽĞƐŽŶĨŝĚĞŶƚŝĂůDĞĂŶŽŶĨŝĚĞŶƚŝĂů ?Ŷ/ŵƉŽƌƚĂŶƚĞǀĞůŽƉŵĞŶƚŝŶƚŚĞ>ĂǁŽĨDĞĚŝĂƚŝŽŶĂŶĚƚŚĞ
tŝƚŚŽƵƚWƌĞũƵĚŝĐĞZƵůĞƐ ?(2007) Arbitration 73(3) 335-341, 337 
117 Unilever (n76) 
Whether the law requires reform in this regard will be considered further below. Here, however, it is 
argued that in view of the decision in Aird, it is difficult to accept the assertions of Mackie and his 
ĐŽůůĞĂŐƵĞƐ ? ǁŚŽ ŶŽƚĞ ƚŚĂƚ ƚŚĞ ŽƵƌƚ ŽĨ ƉƉĞĂů ĚĞĐŝƐŝŽŶ ƐŚŽƵůĚ  ‘ŵĂŬĞ ŶŽ ĚŝĨĨĞƌĞŶĐĞ ƚŽ ƚŚĞ
fƵŶĚĂŵĞŶƚĂůƐ ŽĨ ŵĞĚŝĂƚŝŽŶ ĐŽŶĨŝĚĞŶƚŝĂůŝƚǇ ?118 but rather applies only to documents not produced 
specifically for the mediation itself.119  Again, it is argued that this is a mere technical point which 
fails to consider the public policy reasoning behind encouraging parties to seek to resolve disputes 
through mediation, and thus undermines the operation of confidentiality.  It is conceded however, 
ƚŚĂƚƚŚĞĂƵƚŚŽƌƐĂƌĞĐŽƌƌĞĐƚƚŚĂƚƚŚĞŵĞƌĞĨĂĐƚƚŚĂƚĚŽĐƵŵĞŶƚƐĂƌĞƉƌŽĚƵĐĞĚ ‘ĨŽƌƚŚĞĨŝƌƐƚƚŝŵĞ ?120 
during a mediation, should not prevent those documents from being available to a judge under the 
Rule 35.12(3) of the Civil Procedure Rules121 in any subsequent litigation; to hold otherwise may 
simply render mediation a means by which parties could avoid documents detrimental to their own 
case being available to a judge, but it is argued that this should fall under one of the Unilever 
exceptions rather than being the general position. In any event, not only was it recorded in the 
ĂŐƌĞĞŵĞŶƚ ƚŚĂƚ  ‘ŽƚŚĞƌǁŝƐĞ ĂĚŵŝƐƐŝďůĞ ĞǀŝĚĞŶĐĞ ǁould not become inadmissible simply because it 
ǁĂƐƵƐĞĚŝŶŵĞĚŝĂƚŝŽŶ ?122 but even if that were not the case, such unconscionable behaviour would, 
as Altaras notes, lead to a forfeit of the operation of the principle of privilege anyway,123 and thus it 
is argued that such attempts to influence the outcome of future litigation are unlikely to occur in 
practice.   
However, the fact that this is indeed the case, it is argued, has no bearing on the question of 
whether the decision has altered the facets of mediation and confidentiality, as Mackie and his 
colleagues suggest.124  Rather, it is suggested, it demonstrates that mediation confidentiality is not 
absolute but applies in a varying manner according to the specific circumstances of a case.  Indeed, 
support for this may be taken from the assertions of Mildred, who argues that the guidance which 
should be taken by practitioners following Aird is that in order to ensure that parties understand the 
ŶĂƚƵƌĞŽĨĐŽŶĨŝĚĞŶƚŝĂůŝƚǇĂƐĂƉƉůŝĞƐ ƚŽƚŚĞŝƌĂŐƌĞĞŵĞŶƚ ?ĐĂƌĞƐŚŽƵůĚďĞƚĂŬĞŶƚŽĞŶƐƵƌĞƚŚĂƚ  ‘ǁŽƌŬ
done by experts for the purpose of mediation to which privilege or without prejudice applies, [is] 
kepƚĞŶƚŝƌĞůǇƐĞƉĂƌĂƚĞĨƌŽŵũŽŝŶƚƐƚĂƚĞŵĞŶƚƐ ?125 produced under the CPR.  At first glance, this does 
appear a rather sensible conclusion and indeed it is accepted that if parties understand the nature of 
all documents prepared for or used during the mediation, then such an approach would ensure 
clarity in terms of the nature of confidentiality: non-privileged documents should be treated 
separately to privileged documents.126  However, we would argued that this fails to recognise the 
very circumstances in which the ostensible lack of confidentiality arose in Aird, namely that there 
ǁĂƐĂ ‘ŵƵĚĚůĞ ?127 over the very nature of the documents and whether the privilege applied to those 
documents, and also that in practice, if a court orders parties to undertake mediation as part of 
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123 ůƚĂƌĂƐ ? ‘dŚĞtŝƚŚŽƵƚWƌĞũƵĚŝĐĞZƵůĞŝŶ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124 Mackie et al (n52) 118 
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126 Editor (n122) 7 
127 Aird (n105) per May LJ at [21] 
litigious proceedings, it seems impractical to suggest that all documents will be able to be kept 
separately as Mildred encourages.128  
Bartlett observes that one should be careful not to conflate issues of confidentiality with the 
question of privilege, as the mere fact that information, whether in document form or otherwise, is 
ĐŽŶĨŝĚĞŶƚŝĂůĚŽĞƐŶŽƚƉƌĞĐůƵĚĞŝƚĨƌŽŵďĞŝŶŐĂĚŵŝƐƐŝďůĞŝŶĐŽƵƌƚĂŶĚƚŚĂƚ ‘ƉƌŝǀŝůĞŐĞŽĨĨĞƌƐĨĂƌƐƚƌŽŶŐĞƌ
ĂŐĂŝŶƐƚĚŝƐĐůŽƐƵƌĞƚŚĂŶĐŽŶĨŝĚĞŶƚŝĂůŝƚǇ ? ?129  We do not seek to contend the truth of such an assertion; 
rather, it is suggested that privilege, as noted above, simply refers to the status of documents which 
may be used in a mediation and does not refer to all confidential information and that as such, this 
may lead to circumstances in which parties believe the process is more confidential that it actually 
ĂƉƉĞĂƌƐ ƚŽ ďĞ ? Ɛ ĂƌƚůĞƚƚ ŽďƐĞƌǀĞƐ ? ĐŽŶƚƌĂĐƚƵĂů ĐŽŶĨŝĚĞŶƚŝĂůŝƚǇ  ‘ĚŽĞƐ ŶŽƚ ŝƚƐĞůĨ ƉƌŽǀŝĚĞ Ă ƐŚŝĞůĚ
ĂŐĂŝŶƐƚĂǁŝƚŶĞƐƐƐƵŵŵŽŶƐŽƌĚĞƚĞƌŵŝŶĞƚŚĞŝƐƐƵĞŽĨĂĚŵŝƐƐŝďŝůŝƚǇ ? ?130 In this sense, it is suggested 
that the belief that a confidential process protects a party from information revealed during a 
mediation from being revealed in court, when in fact circumstances may arise where that 
information is able to be revealed in litigation, illustrates a gap between the theory and the practical 
application of mediation confidentiality, and may thus undermine its practical significance.  Possible 
reform in this regard will be considered in the following section. 
Options for Reform 
It has been shown throughout this article that confidentiality is of paramount practical significance in 
a mediation process.  It has been asserted that notwithstanding the fact that mediation is 
considered to be an inherently confidential process,131 such confidentiality generally arises in the 
context of the operation of the Without Prejudice rules, rather than as a result of any rules relating 
to confidentiality per se.  It was shown above that notwithstanding the theoretical limitations to 
these rules being narrow, and thus appearing to protect the confidentiality of parties to a mediation, 
supporting the public policy of encouraging full disclosures during the mediation process, in practice 
the Without Prejudice rules do not always apply in mediation,132 leading to confusion as to the 
extent of mediation confidentiality and perhaps creating a disincentive for parties to choose to enter 
mediation.  Even if the without prejudice rules were to be modified further in their operation within 
mediation to provide further clarity as to when they might apply  we would suggest that this would 
not solve the problems with confidentiality as demonstrated throughout this work. As has been 
observed throughout, mediation is described as a confidential process rather than a process to 
which the Without Prejudice rules apply, and thus the latter simply serves to secure confidentiality 
in the process; it does not create a mediation process which is confidential of itself.133  So greater 
certainty in operation of the Without Prejudice rules would have no application to the gap between 
theory and practice in terms of the drafting of confidentiality clauses in mediation contracts, or 
ŝŵƉĂĐƚ ƵƉŽŶ ƉĂƌƚŝĞƐ ? ĂƉƉĂƌĞŶƚůǇ ŵŝƐŐƵŝĚĞĚ ďĞůŝĞĨ ƚŚĂƚ ŝƚ ŝƐ ƚŚĞ ŵĞĚŝĂƚŝŽŶ ƉƌŽĐĞƐƐ ǁŚŝĐŚ ŝƐ
confidential134 rather than the application of the Without Prejudice rules to that process. Of course, 
one may be inclined to suggest here that we require a new approach to mediation practice, whereby 
                                                          
128 Mildred (n125) C80 
129 ibid at 113 
130 ibid at 114 
131 Zamboni (n43) footnote 1 
132 Aird (n105) 
133 Brooker (n6) 187 
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mediators would be required to make it clear to parties that in practice confidentiality  W in so far as 
it relates to disclosures of what took place in mediation in any consequent litigation - would be 
secured through the operation of the Without Prejudice rules, but this offers a clumsy solution 
difficult to articulate to would-be participants and sits rather uneasily with the current 
understanding of mediation as being an inherently confidential process.135   
ŵĞĚŝĂƚŽƌ ?ƐƉƌŝǀŝůĞŐĞ ?
To clarify matters, some commentators have averred that a privilege should be created, which 
applies specifically to mediators.136 This, Kallipetis has argued, should operate in the similar manner 
to the absolute privilege which applies to information divulged by client to legal representative.137  
Such a privilege, it is contended, bolstered by use of the term in mediation contracts, could be 
developed as a matter of the common law requiring no statutory intervention138. Whilst this would 
certainly ensure that any information provided to the mediator would remain confidential and that 
this may apply to any disclosures made or documents produced at mediation, thus seeming to 
address many of the concerns raised in this article, we would raise a note of caution. The role of the 
mediator is to act as a neutral third party.  It has been arguĞĚƚŚĂƚŝĨƚŚĞŵĞĚŝĂƚŽƌ ?ƐƌŽůĞŝƐĂůƚĞƌĞd 
through the development of a professional privilege akin to that applying to lawyers,139 then such 
neutrality will be difficult to maintain and parties may, thus, envisage mediators to be acting for 
them as an advocate, rather than simply facilitating the settlement of disputes between the parties.  
Specific legislative provisions governing confidentiality and privilege 
In order to avoid such problems, and in particular to recognise the active role of parties in the 
process, an alternative approach is that confidentiality in mediation be protected in its own right 
through specific legislative provisions.140  This method has the obvious advantage that it does what it 
says on the tin  W as is commonly described, confidentiality attaches to the mediation process itself.  
We would note that while ascribing confidentiality in this way to mediation is more straightforward 
and can lead to greater certainty in mediation, it potentially suffers from definitional and 
interpretive problems, thus not removing all ambiguity.  Such difficulties may arise in a number of 
ways.  First, it must be clear in any specific confidentiality provision as to what kind of mediation 
conducted by which mediators, is covered thereby.  Where a provision relates to, for example, 
referral emanating from the direction of a court or falls within the confines of a particular statutory 
scheme then there may be little difficulty identifying when that measure applies or not but the 
situation is not so clear cut in respect of the wide panoply of mediation practice generally.  A second 
matter that may militate against certainty pertains to the exceptions to the provisions relative to 
privilege which may be spelt out in any specific measure.  In this sense, it is interesting to note that 
whilst the discussion throughout this work has argued that the scope of the Without Prejudice 
privilege should be wide enough to ensure that parties can make disclosures during a mediation 
process without needing to be guarded about the content of those disclosures, in case of them not 
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being confidential in any subsequent litigation, Thompson suggests that legislation defining the 
scope of mediation confidentiality would have the additional benefit of being able to limit the scope 
of confidentiality as secured.141 ,Ğ ĂƌŐƵĞƐ ƚŚĂƚ ƚŚĞ  ‘ƐĐŽƉĞ ŽĨ ĐŽŶĨŝĚĞŶƚŝĂůŝƚǇ ŵƵƐƚ ŶŽƚ ďĞ ďƌŽĂĚĞƌ
ƚŚĂŶ ŶĞĐĞƐƐĂƌǇ ƚŽ ƉƌŽƚĞĐƚ ƚŚĞ ůĞŐŝƚŝŵĂƚĞ ŝŶƚĞƌĞƐƚƐ ?142 of mediating parties and that legislation 
defining the operation of such rules in the context of mediation  could be used to narrow its 
application rather than simply to provide certainty.143 There may be some merit in such arguments: 
it was noted earlier in the work for example, that it would be unconscionable to allow parties to rely 
on confidentiality to gain an unfair advantage in subsequent litigation or to exercise other 
unconscionable behaviour.  It was shown though that such problems are mitigated not simply by the 
Unilever exceptions but also by the general operation of English civil procedure, which does not 
allow a party to use the law to further impropriety.144   Moreover, in the context of the co-mingling 
of mediation with formal civil justice processes, particularly those involving pro se litigants, through 
court-annexed mediation programmes, the justifications for rendering the process more porous may 
be compelling.  This, for example, ŵĂǇ ďĞ ƐŽ  “ƚŽ ĞŶƐƵƌĞ ƚŚĂƚ ƉĂƌƚŝĞƐ ĂƌĞ ŶŽƚ ƉƌĞƐƐƵƌĞĚ ŝŶƚŽ
settlement or dealt with unfairly within the prŽĐĞƐƐ ? or to guard against tactical abuse of the process 
by parties pressured into mediation use.145 
Current UK statutory provisions  
By using two extant provisions  W those applying to family mediation in Scotland and those relative to 
UK cross border disputes W we analyse below how such issues applying to mediation practice 
generally may be resolved in practice146.  This first example is the confidentiality in mediation 
emanating from the 2008 European Mediation Directive.147  Whilst the Directive has now been 
implemented into UK law,148 it must be observed that it applies only to cross-border mediations and 
does not form part of the law in the UK in respect of domestic mediations.149 The Directive requires 
that a mediator or anyone involved in the administration of mediation shall not be compelled to give 
evidence in civil and commercial judicial proceedings or arbitration regarding information arising out 
of or in connection with a mediation process ?150 subject to narrow exceptions of public policy.151  
Examples of such exceptions are spelt out in the Directive including matters pertaining to child 
protection issues and protection from physical or psychological harm. The language of the Directive 
is broadly replicated in the empowering legislation which brings the provision into English law.  The 
ůĞŐŝƐůĂƚŝŽŶƉƌŽǀŝĚĞƐƚŚĂƚ “9.  Subject to regulation 10, a mediator or a mediation administrator has 
the right to withhold mediation evidence in civil and commercial judicial proceedings and 
arbitration. 10.  A court may order that a mediator or a mediation administrator must give or 
disclose mediation evidence where ?  (a)all parties to the mediation agree to the giving or disclosure 
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of the mediation evidence; (b)the giving or disclosure of the mediation evidence is necessary for 
overriding considerations of public policy, in accordance with article 7(1)(a) of the Mediation 
Directive; or (c)the mediation evidence relates to the mediation settlement, and the giving or 
disclosure of the mediation settlement is necessary to implement or enforce the mediation 
settlement agreement ?152.   
While the focus of the Directive is on mediator compellability, the way that the rules have been 
brought into the Civil Procedural Rules153crucially also encompass the admissibility of documents 
used in the mediation under the control of the mediator, and do not simply apply to disclosures 
made to the mediator by parties.  It is submitted that this approach, if it were adopted more 
generally to mediation, would help ensure that problems in cases such as Aird do not arise. Indeed, 
one is therefore inclined to agree with the assertions of Tumbridge, who argues that incorporating 
the provisions of the Directive into UK law for domestic mediation would be beneficial in terms of 
ensuring that mediation is indeed a confidential process.154 Given that confidentiality has been 
shown throughout this work to have immense practical significance, one can only consider such a 
move to be desirable in ensuring that confidentiality is as successful in practice as it is in mediation 
theory.155 Despite the positives here, the public policy exceptions that allow disclosure do remain 
undefined and may give rise to continued uncertainty156.  However, it does seem that the public 
policy exceptions articulated in the DiƌĞĐƚŝǀĞ ?ƐĞƚŽƵƚŝŶƌƚŝĐůĞ ? ? ?Ă )ĂƐ “ŽǀĞƌƌŝĚŝŶŐconsiderations of 
ƉƵďůŝĐ ƉŽůŝĐǇ ? Qin particular when required to  “ensure the protection of the best interests of 
ĐŚŝůĚƌĞŶŽƌ ƚŽƉƌĞǀĞŶƚŚĂƌŵƚŽƚŚĞƉŚǇƐŝĐĂůŽƌƉƐǇĐŚŽůŽŐŝĐĂů ŝŶƚĞŐƌŝƚǇŽĨĂƉĞƌƐŽŶ ? are likely to be 
narrower than ƚŚĞŐĞŶĞƌĂů ‘ŝŶƚĞƌĞƐƚƐŽĨũƵƐƚŝĐĞ ?ĞǆĐĞƉƚŝŽŶƐƚŽǁŝƚŚŽƵƚƉƌĞũƵĚŝĐĞƉƌŝǀŝůĞŐĞ as operated 
by the courts.   While this may help undergird the process and can certainly be seen as helpful in the 
ĐŽŶƚĞǆƚŽĨƚŚĞŝƌĞĐƚŝǀĞ ?ƐĚƌŝǀĞto increase the use of mediation in commercial cross border affairs, 
as we note above, the need for confidentiality to give way to more pressing policy concerns may 
become more compelling in other contexts, including but not limited to court connected mediation 
involving relatively disempowered individuals.  
In this sense, one other model that could be followed in respect of mediation more generally is that 
which applies to the process in the context of family disputes in Scotland.  Indeed it is perhaps not 
that well known across the UK that for family mediation in Scotland, legislative provisions157 have 
been in force for some time.  This rather short Act applies to all types of family mediation158  but only 
with regard to mediation ĐŽŶĚƵĐƚĞĚ “ďǇĂƉĞƌƐŽŶĂĐĐƌĞdited as a mediator in family mediation to an 
organisation which is concerned with such mediation and which is approved for the purposes of this 
ĐƚďǇƚŚĞ>ŽƌĚWƌĞƐŝĚĞŶƚŽĨƚŚĞŽƵƌƚŽĨ^ĞƐƐŝŽŶ ? ?159 The central premise of the Act is encapsulated 
in s 1(1) wŚŝĐŚŚŽůĚƐƚŚĂƚ “ŶŽŝŶĨŽƌŵĂƚŝŽŶĂƐƚŽǁŚĂƚŽĐĐƵƌƌĞĚĚƵƌŝŶŐƚŚĞĨĂŵŝůǇŵĞĚŝĂƚŝŽŶƚŽǁŚŝĐŚ
ƚŚŝƐ Đƚ ĂƉƉůŝĞƐ ƐŚĂůů ďĞ ĂĚŵŝƐƐŝďůĞ ĂƐ ĞǀŝĚĞŶĐĞ ŝŶ ĂŶǇ Đŝǀŝů ƉƌŽĐĞĞĚŝŶŐƐ ? ?Any reference to what 
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matters arising from breakdown of marriage, civil partnership or cohabitation 
159 S 1. 
occurred during family mediation includes a reference to what was said, written or observed during 
such mediation.160 
Although the wording here thus may seem strong in its defence of confidentiality in mediation, the 
Act sets out a number of exceptions to this general premise.  Prior to examining those exceptions it 
should also be noted that the Act does not apply to any family mediation in Scotland undertaken by 
mediators not currently approved by the Lord President.161  As we note above, the issue of defining 
what type of ŵĞĚŝĂƚŝŽŶ ?ƐƵŶĚĞƌƚĂŬĞŶďǇǁŚŝĐŚŵĞĚŝĂƚŽƌƐis covered by any legislative enacted is a 
key issue to be resolved in the introduction of confidentiality provisions applying to mediation in a 
more general context.  In terms of the exceptions to the general rule regarding non admissibility, 
aside from particular caveats that apply to consequent child protection proceedings, further 
exceptions bear significant similarly with those that might arise under operation of without prejudice 
rules.  They include evidence as to the existence or otherwise of any agreement reached in 
mediation; in the event of any challenge to a contract forged in mediation, information as to the 
contract that relates to this challenge; information as to what occurred in the mediation  if all parties 
(except the mediator) agrees to this effect; information arising where proceedings are raised against 
the mediator or any party at the mediation in respect of damage to property or personal injury 
allegedly carried out by that person; or information arising out of proceedings arising from the 
mediation to which the mediator is a party.162  So while the issue of whether or not disclosures were 
made in a genuine attempt to settle or not  W relevant in the without prejudice privilege - does not 
bear examination under the Act in determining exceptions to the confidentiality rule and hence can 
be seen as a boon to the process in terms of providing certainty for parties, there does remain scope 
for disclosures and documents tendered in mediation to be admissible in consequent litigation in a 
range of areas. 
FiŶĂůůǇ ?ǁŚŝůĞƚŚĞĞǆĐĞƉƚŝŽŶĂďŽǀĞƌĞůĂƚŝŶŐƚŽƚŚĞ ‘ĞǆŝƐƚĞŶĐĞŽƌŽƚŚĞƌǁŝƐĞŽĨĂŶǇĂŐƌĞĞŵĞŶƚƌĞĂĐŚĞĚ
ŝŶŵĞĚŝĂƚŝŽŶ ?ŵĂǇƐĞĞŵƵŶĐŽŶƚƌŽǀĞƌƐŝĂů and simply following a well founded exception to without 
prejudice privilege, a recent case exemplifies the uncertainties that can arise in this respect.   FJM v 
GMC163 involved a married couple with two children who had lived in Australia until their separation.  
The father petitioned the court under the provisions of the Hague Convention on Abduction that his 
spouse had unlawfully removed their children to Scotland164.  The wife accepted that she had 
contravened the terms of the Convention but argued that the petitioner had acquiesced in their 
removal.  More importantly for our purposes, although the mediation could not have been said to 
have settled all issues between the parties, she argued that he had agreed in their discussions in 
mediation that the children could remain in Scotland and that he would not invoke his rights seeking 
the return of the children under the Convention.  The father claimed that any such information 
disclosed in the mediation was not admissible in any subsequent court proceedings by way of s 1 of 
ƚŚĞŝǀŝůDĞĚŝĂƚŝŽŶǀŝĚĞŶĐĞĐƚ ?dŚĞƉĞƚŝƚŝŽŶĞƌ ?ƐĐĂƐĞĨ ůůĂƚƚŚĞĨŝƌƐƚŚƵƌĚůĞĂƐƚŚĞĐŽƵƌƚŚĞůĚƚŚĂt 
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the Act did not in fact apply to cross border Hague Convention disputes of this nature165.  Although 
not germane to the decision in the case, Lord Stewart then proceeded to remark obiter that even if 
the legislation did apply it was unlikely that the statements of the petitioner would have been 
ƉƌŽƚĞĐƚĞĚ ŐŝǀĞŶ ƚŚĂƚ ŽŶĞ ŽĨ ƚŚĞ ƌĞĐŽŐŶŝƐĞĚ ĞǆĐĞƉƚŝŽŶƐ ŝŶ ƚŚĞ Đƚ ƌĞůĂƚĞĚ ƚŽ  “ĞǀŝĚĞŶĐĞ ĂƐ ƚŽ ƚŚĞ
ĞǆŝƐƚĞŶĐĞŽƌŽƚŚĞƌǁŝƐĞŽĨĂŶǇĂŐƌĞĞŵĞŶƚƌĞĂĐŚĞĚŝŶŵĞĚŝĂƚŝŽŶ ? ?166   The statements regarding the 
agreement of the petitioner in this sense were recorded in series of emails between the mediator 
and the parties and in this case recorded in a note of the outcomes by the mediator.167  This case 
then highlights the uncertainties that can arise in respect of agreements that might be made by the 
parties in a complex mediation regarding a range of issues presented that may be disclosed in 
consequent litigation.  
  
Conclusion  
It is clear that confidentiality in mediation is of huge practical significance. Parties may choose to 
enter mediation on the basis that the process is inherently confidential.  Mediation itself may lead to 
cost savings and more effective solutions to those disputes but its very success may depend in part 
at least on the confidentiality required to persuade parties to be candid in their negotiations and 
interaction with the mediator.  It is essential then that, subject to necessary qualification, mediation 
is indeed rendered a confidential process.   There is a mismatch between the oft peddled truism that 
the mediation process is a confidential one and the fact that in reality what confidentiality does in 
practice arise largely does so through the without prejudice privilege.  Moreover, although it is true 
that the scope of these rules is wide, recent case law suggests that this is the case more in theory 
than in practice and significant uncertainties abound. 
It is, therefore, imperative in our view ƚŚĂƚƚŚĞůĂǁŝƐƌĞĨŽƌŵĞĚƚŽĞŶƐƵƌĞƚŚĂƚƉĂƌƚŝĞƐ ?ĞǆƉĞĐƚĂƚŝŽŶƐ
in terms of the confidentiality of the mediation process are met.  In order to do this, we would argue 
that the most effective reforms would be to enact provisions which undergirded the mediation 
process itself with confidentiality as it applies to the admissibility of evidence and compellability of 
witnesses in any consequent legal proceedings.  This is no simple task, however.  Choices remain to 
be made in terms of how such provisions should be crafted.  The approach taken in respect of the 
recent European Directive ?Ɛ implementation for cross border disputes may seem an obvious choice 
at least in so far as it is bolstered by the CPR rules which ensure that the provisions pertain both to 
compellability of the mediator and admissibility of evidence of materials within his or her control in 
consequent court proceedings.   Moreover, in terms of promoting the sanctity of the process, the 
exceptions to the rule proscribing admissibility and compellability in the cross border rules, although 
not articulated clearly, do seem relatively narrow ǁŝƚŚ ƚŚĞŝƌ ĞŵƉŚĂƐŝƐ ŽŶ  ‘ŽǀĞƌƌŝĚŝŶŐ ƉŽůŝĐǇ
ĐŽŶƐŝĚĞƌĂƚŝŽŶƐ ? of the Member State.168  By contrast, the approach seen in the Scottish Evidence 
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(Family Mediation Scotland) Act 1985 sets out in more detail the exceptions to the general rules 
around confidentiality and compellability but in so doing are more reflective of extant approaches 
found in the without prejudice rules and suggest a wider scope for disregarding the central tenets of 
the provision. 
Reflecting the divergences in these approaches, those crafting any general provision applying to 
confidentiality in mediation in general must grapple with the potential conflict between encouraging 
mediation through promises of confidentiality, providing certainty in the confidentiality regime and 
also ensuring that unconscionable conduct which too stringent controls on disclosure would 
facilitate is not permitted.  The latter may be of more import, the more the process is intertwined 
with the court and/or involving relatively disempowered individuals with limited access to legal 
advice and assistance, than in the world of private, voluntary commercial mediation involving 
sophisticated, legally represented participants. This issue is redolent of the fact that mediation is not 
an homogenous process and one that operates in quite different ways in very different dispute 
contexts.  For example, what may seem appropriate rules of confidentiality in private, high end 
commercial mediation where sophisticated parties are represented by expert lawyers, may not hold 
in environments involving relatively disempowered, pro se litigants, mediating under the order of a 
court or as a prerequisite of legal aid. 
We saw from discussion of the Scottish Evidence (Family Mediation) (Scotland) Act that it was held 
in the court169 that cross border Hague Border disputes were to be excluded from its jurisdiction 
leaving significant uncertainty.  This exemplifies a further issue to be overcome in any drafting.  
Great care should be taken to define the parameters and reach of the provision.  A number of 
questions arise in enacting any general provision applying to mediation more broadly.  Should all 
forms of mediation including family, consumer, commercial, employment construction etc be 
included in the reach of any new provision?  Could the same set of general rules apply in all these 
different areas?   
Moreover, as we noted above in the Scottish legislation only mediation conducted by approved 
mediators is covered by the provision.   In this respect, any moves to establish confidentiality 
provisions for mediation more generally may for example require a definition of the terms, 
 ‘ŵĞĚŝĂƚŝŽŶ ? ĂŶĚ  ‘ŵĞĚŝĂƚŽƌ ? ĂŶĚ ƉŽƐĞ ĨƵƌƚŚĞƌ ƋƵĞƐƚŝŽŶƐ ŝŶ ƌĞƐƉĞĐƚ ŽĨ the current laissez faire 
regulation of mediation which currently subsists in the UK170.  If mediation were to be rendered less 
porous by statutory intervention it can be argued that mediators governing the process should be 
more tightly regulated to ensure that malpractice and unfairness in the process is rooted out.  More 
stringent regulation of mediators and prescriptive definitions of mediation are likely to be met with 
hostility from parts of the mediation community, however.171 
While recognising the difficulties above, as a starting point to legislative reform we propose the 
following.  Although it is tempting to argue that the bespoke family regime as regards confidentiality 
in Scotland be replicated in this dispute area south of the border, on balance it seems more sensible 
                                                          
169 In FJM V CGM [2015]CSOH 130   
170 There are no required regulatory standards for mediators in the UK although various voluntary codes of practice exist eg 
through the Civil Mediation Council (England and Wales) and Scottish Mediation Network (Scotland). 
171 ^ĞĞĨŽƌĞǆĂŵƉůĞ ?s ?ZĂŵƐĂǇ ‘Mediation 2020: a presentation to the Chartered Institute of Arbitrators' 4th Annual 
DĞĚŝĂƚŝŽŶ^ǇŵƉŽƐŝƵŵ ?KĐƚŽďĞƌ ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? )Arbitration 78(2):159  For a discussion of mediation regulation more 
generally  see A. Boon et al  ‘ZĞŐƵůĂƚŝŶŐDĞĚŝĂƚŽƌƐ ? ? ? ? ? ? )Legal Ethics 10: 1 
for the sake of cohesion to extend the extant approach applying to cross border disputes in England 
and Wales coupled with the implementing provisions in the CPR to mediation to domestic mediation 
 W encompassing family mediation and other areas of civil practice encompassed in the Directive.  
Indeed, the UK is one of only a handful of States that has chosen not to extend the terms of the 
Directive to domestic disputes.   This approach would allow application  of the provision to the same 
wide range of areas that the directive applies to (while dispensing with the limitation to cross border 
ŵĂƚƚĞƌƐ )ĂŶĚĂůƐŽĂĚŽƉƚƚŚĞďƌŽĂĚĚĞĨŝŶŝƚŝŽŶŽĨ ‘ŵĞĚŝĂƚŝŽŶ ?ĂŶĚ ‘ŵĞĚŝĂƚŽƌ ?ĂƐƐĞƚŽƵƚŝŶƚŚĞirective 
which should aid in limiting definitional problems172.  As noted above, the exceptions to 
confidentiality espoused in the Directive may be seen as narrow and ill-defined and thus give rise to 
both uncertainty and concerns over the process not being sufficiently porous.  Nonetheless, we 
would argue that the exceptions carried through as they are in the empowering legislation may be 
flexible enough to meet the needs of different environments.  The difficulties over what may 
amount to an agreement as seen in FJM v GMC173 aside, it seems uncontroversial for exceptions to 
be made as regards determining the existence of any agreement reached in the mediation.  Equally 
ǁĞǀŝĞǁ ƚŚĂƚ ƚŚĞ ƉƌŝǀŝůĞŐĞ ƐŚŽƵůĚ ŶŽƚ ďĞ ƚŚĞŵĞĚŝĂƚŽƌ ?Ɛ ĂŶĚ ƚŚƵƐ ĂůůŽǁŝŶŐ ǁĂŝǀŝŶŐ ĐŽŶĨŝĚĞŶƚŝĂůŝƚǇ
where all parties to the mediation agree is in our view the correct approach.  The wider exceptions 
as ƚŚĞǇ ƉĞƌƚĂŝŶ ƚŽ ? ŽǀĞƌƌŝĚŝŶŐ ĐŽŶƐŝĚĞƌĂƚŝŽŶƐ ŽĨ ƉƵďůŝĐ ƉŽůŝĐǇ ?174 are likely to be construed in a 
narrow fashion In a private commercial mediation, for example, where sophisticated parties mediate 
with lawyers in tow.  This should help undergird the process with more certainty thus encouraging 
further use.  The opposite may be true in the court connected environment involving party litigants 
with no access to legal advice and assistance, perhaps channelled into a process with little choice or 
understanding of what it will entail where public policy may dictate a more porous process allowing 
mediation to be opened up to post-hoc scrutiny.  In this sense while the Directive makes particular 
ƌĞĨĞƌĞŶĐĞƚŽůŝŵŝƚŝŶŐĐŽŶĨŝĚĞŶƚŝĂůŝƚǇƚŽ “ensure the protection of the best interests of children or to 
ƉƌĞǀĞŶƚ ŚĂƌŵ ƚŽ ƚŚĞ ƉŚǇƐŝĐĂů Žƌ ƉƐǇĐŚŽůŽŐŝĐĂů ŝŶƚĞŐƌŝƚǇ ŽĨ Ă ƉĞƌƐŽŶ ? ? ƚŚĞƐĞ ĂƌĞ ŝŶĚŝĐĂƚŝǀĞ ŵĂƚƚĞƌƐ
only to which the policy exceptions are not necessarily limited.  One could this argue that where 
more vulnerable parties mediate public policy exceptions could extend to a wider range of matters 
including alleged misconduct or excessive pressure by a mediator as well as misrepresentation by an 
opponent. 
In terms of the regulation of mediators, while the European Directive allowed extant, market-based 
approaches to continue (as has occurred in the UK)175, we would argue that it sensible to continue 
this approach at least in the short term.  While a detailed discussion of mediation regulation is 
outside the scope of this work, we would note that the circumstances where the need for more 
stringent regulation becomes more pressing  W for example, in the court connected setting involving 
more vulnerable parties  Wmay be subject to local arrangements, such as court rosters prescribing 
which mediators can operate in this area and the extent of training and regulatory requirements 
that should apply to them.   
In sum, then while it is our view then that new legislation underpinning confidentiality in mediation 
is the best way to bridge the gap between theory and practice we recognise that it is no easy task. 
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174 European Directive article 7(1)(a) 
175 European Directive Recitals, paras 14 and 22. 
Our ideas above may represent a launch pad for further discussion and debate.   In this sense, 
borƌŽǁŝŶŐ ĨƌŽŵ ŵĞĚŝĂƚŝŽŶ ?Ɛ ďŽŽŬ ? ĂŶ ŽƉƚŝŵƵŵ ĂƉƉƌŽĂĐŚ ĐĂŶ ŽŶůǇ ďĞ ĚĞǀĞůŽƉĞĚ ďǇ ĨŽƐƚĞƌŝŶŐ
engagement and meaningful dialogue between mediators and their representational organisations, 
end users, legal professional bodies and policy makers.   
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
  
  
 
 
